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RICHFIELD OIL CORPORATIO~ (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. ITBLIC rTILITIES CO~DIISSW~ OF
TIlE STATE OF CALIFOl{KL\, ReSp01H1L'llt; SOFl'IlERN COUNTIES G"\S CO)IPANY OF CALIFORNIA
(a Corporation), Real Party in Interest.
[Two Cases.]
[So F. Nos. 20303, 20313.

In Bank.

July 1, 1060.]

S01JTIlERN CALIFOR~IA EDISON COMPANY (a Corporation), Petition!.'r, V. PFBT.JIC eTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNL\, Respondent; SOUTHERN C01JNTIES GAS COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Real Party in Interest.
[Two Cases.]

)

[1] Public Utilities-Dedication to Public Use.-Although the requirement of the Public Utilities Act of service or delivery of
any commodity "to the public or any portion thereof" suggests
dedication, the definition of those word" as including "a person" or "private corporation" suggests the contrary, and the
language that is codified in Pub. Uti!. Code, § 216, subd. (c),
does not require that the initial performance of service or delivery of a commodity be made "to the public or auy portion
thereof."
[2] ld.-Dedication to Public Use.-It may be assumed that initially dedication as a prerequisite to public utility regulation
was imposed as a li:nitation on the broad lan;;uage of the Public
Utilities Act solely to meet con"titutional objections that arc
no longer valid. However, in view of the history of the act
and the substantial reiinnce on its consistent interpretatioll
and application by the Supreme Comt and the Public Utilities
Commission (or its predecessor) for more than 40 years, it
must be cOllclmh'd that the Legi~lature by its repeated reenactment of the definition" of public utilities without change
has accepted nnd adopteJ dedicntion as un implicit limitation
on their terms.

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Puhlic Utilities and Services, § 2 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-·1] Public Utilities, § 6; [5,9, 10, 1217] Gas, § 1; [6,7] Oil, § 3; [S, 11] Public Utilities, § 4.
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[3] Id.-Dedication to Public Use.-The conclusion that the statutory Jdinitiolls of public utilities apply only to utilities that
have dedicated their property to public use does not render
the broad language of Pub. Util. Code, §~ :207, 216, subd. (c),
superlluous; those provisions make clear that a utility that ha;;
dcdicated its property to public use is a public utility thoug-h
it llIay serve only one or a few customers or a utility that in
turn serves the public.
[4] Id.-Dedication to Public Use.-Pub. Util. Code, ~ 216, subd.
(c), allays any doubt that a public utility that has been serving
the public directly remains such though it turns its distributing system over to a publicly or privately owned utility and
thereafter limits its own business to supplying the utility that
directly serves the public.
[5] Gas-Regulation.-In the oil and gas industry, abandonment
of the requirement of dedication as a prerequisite to regulation
would subject every oil and gas producer that has sold or
proposes to sell gas for light, heat or power or for resale to the
public to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission.
To impose such regulation on the oil and gas industry by a new
construction of the Public Utilities Act would create manifold
problems; only the Legislature can properly determine whether
such or some other form of regulation should be imposed to
promote the public interest.
[6] Oil-Regulation.-Although a corporation may operate part
of its business as a public utility and part in a purely private
capacity, the administrative difficulties of effective regUlation
when the two parts are so closely interrelated as the production of oil and gas are apparent. 'Where as a producer's unequivocal dedication of part of its property to It public use
affords a basis for segregating its regulated from its unrcgulnted activity, if the settled standard of dedication were to be
nbandoned, some other method would have to be developed
for segregating oil and gas operations for purposes of regulation.
[7] Id.-Regulation.-It is not unreasonable to assume that the
requirement of dedication haS' been of ~ome value in obviating
regulation of many small oil and gas producers whose activities
fall within the literal definitions of the Public Utilities AC't,
but are too restricted to merit public concern. Although it
Illay be true that this requirement has also permitted lar;!"!'
producers to escape regulation, existing law provides no alternative to dedication for s,electing those to be regulated;
abolition of one standard to determine who should be regulated
would compel choice of another.
(;'i] See Cal.Jur.2d, Gas Companies, § 5; Am.Jur., G ns and Oil,

*140 et seq.
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[8] Public Utilities-Corporations Subject to Control.-A foreign
corporation rnunot r"<'apr puhlie utilit~· regulation or ('Y:1or
public utility ohlig-ations on th(' ;.:-round that its adiviti('s nl"P
illegal.
[9] Gas-Regulation.-Jf puhlie utility regulntion were (,,,tende.l
to all oil and gas prooncers who fall within the literal language
of the Public Utilities Act . producers who used their gas themselves or sold it to otlwrs to manufacture into chemical products or to use for other purposes not specified in thc act
would escape regulation. Regulation dependent on how the
producer disposes of his gas might stimulate less desirable
unregulated uses at the expense of more desirable regulated
uses.
[10] Id.-Regulation.-The producer's freedom under existing law
to determine how his gas shall be disposed of so long as he does
not dedicate his property to public use has not resulted in
sufficient misuse of gas or sufficiently wasteful marketing practices to induce the Legislature to change it. The Legislature
can best determine whether there should be further regulation
of the oil and gas industry and, if so, th(' form it should take.
[11] Public Utilities-Corporations Subject to Control.-Pub. nil.
Code, § 1001, relating to corporations requiring certifieat('s of
public convenience, npplies only to public utilities.
[12] Gas-Regulation.-Had the L('gislature wished to regulate
competition between public utility and nonpublic utility gas
corporations by requiring certificates of public conwnience
and necessity, it is reasonable to as;;ume that it would have
done so by requiring nonpublic utility gas corporations to
secure certificates to provide service, not merely to build
plants or extension thereof. Regulation of plant construction
and extension is a meaningful adjunct to onrall utility regulation, but as applied to otherwise unregulated utility gas
corporations it would serve haphazardly at best to protect
public utility gas corporations from undesirable competitioll.
[13] Id.-Regulation.-Although an oil and gas producer cou].l
not withdraw property from a use to which it had been dedicated without the Public Utility Commission's consent or
escape regulation by converting all or part of a public utility
service into a nonpublic utility service, it remains free to use
property it has not dedicated to public use llS it sees fit so
long as it does not dedicate such property or prejudice any
public utility obligations it may have assumed.
[14] Id.-Regulation.-In a proceeding attacking orders of t.·e
Public Utilities Commission that an oil and gas producer ,.as
a public utility gas corporation subject to the jurisdictil.1l of
the commission and ordering it to cease and desist from dl livering gas to a public utility electrical corporation, resllution
of conflicting inferences that might be dra \\'n fr01ll tl'S .iIllOIlY
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(Ii I.hc prutluccl":; yicc-prc:;itlcllt with rcgard tu dedication of

rCSl'rVeH for peaking' purposcs was for the commission.
[15] Id.-Regulation.-An oil lind gas pl'odueer did not dedicate
it;; glls rcserves by ag'l'CClllent to sell gas to a public utility
electrical corporation, where such sale was made to a selected
customer und like service was denied to others.
[16] Id.-Regulation.-A corporation that owns property for the
"transmission . . . of gas" (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 221) as a common carrier may be a gas corporation within the meaning of
Pub. Uti!. Code, §§ 221, 222, though it was once also defined
as a pipeline corporation or is arguably so defined on the
theory that gas is a "lluid" substance within the meaning of
§ 227. Despite .the differences between the obligations imposed
by the cOIDmon-carrier condition of the federal act (30 U.S.C.
§ 185) and those imposed on public utilities by the California
act, the holding out to serve the public implicit in common
carriage is at least substantial evidence that would support a
finding that a federal permittee had dedicated its pipeline to
public use for the COllllllon carriage of gas.
[17] Id.-Regulation.-The Public Utilities Act is not concerned
with an oil and gas producer's purely nonpublic utility activities, and its certification provisions may not be invoked to
prohibit the construction and use of facilities for non public
utility activitics merely because the producer may in the indefinite future wish or be called on to make such facilities
available for public use. When and if the producer wishes or
is called on to make its pipeline available for common carriage
of gas, it may then be determined whether its private use must
be curtailed to avoid conflict with any obligation to the public
it assumed in accepting II federal permit subject to the C01l\mon-cnrrier condition.
gllS

PROCEEDINGS to review orders of the Public Utilities
Commission determining that an oil and gas producer, in
respect to its gas operations, was a public utility gas corporation subject to jurisdiction of the commission, and ordering it
to cease and desist from delivering gas to a steam-electric
generating plant. Orders annulled.
Mervyn \V. Phelan, Ball, Hunt & Hart, Joseph A. Ball,
Clark Heggcness, Rollin E. 'Woodbury, Harry \V. Sturges, .Jr ..
Trippet, Yoakum & Ballantyne, Oscar A. Trippet and 'fhomas
II. Carver for Petitioners.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Turner H. McBaine, 0 'Ml·Ivcny & Myers, Pierce \Vorks, Richard C. Bergen, \Villiam \Y.
Alsup, Hanna & Morton, Harold C. Morton, David A. Thomas,
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Prank n. Belcher, l\1I'Cutl'hrn, Doyll', Browll & Enersell,
'William H. Gardner, Stanl",\" & Kirby, and Charl('s C. Stanley
as Amici Curiae on b('half of Petitioncrs.
'William l'1. B(,lln('tt, Chi('f Couns('l, Roderick B. Cassidy,
..Assistant Chief Couns!'!, l'lary :\loran Pajalich, Senior Counsel and J. Calvin Simpson, .:\,,;;is\aut Counsel, for Rcspond('ut.
Reginald L. Vaughan, \Yiiliam P. Gray, Joseph R. Renseh,
Milford Springer and Herman P. Selvin for Real Party in
lntl'rest.
Dion R. Holm, City .Attorn('y (San Fran('isco), Orville I.
\Yright, Drputy City Attol'llry, Rog('r Arn('hrrgh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Alan G. Campbell, Assistant City Attorney, Jean F. DuPaul, Cit~- Attorney (San Diego), Frederick B. Holoboff, Deputy City Attorney, John K. Colwell,
City Attorney (Santa Ana), Thomas W. Bewley, City Attorney (\Yhittier), Charl('s A. Rummel, General Counsel,
California Farm Bureau Federation, William L. Knecht,
Chickering & Gregory, Sherman Chickering, C. Rayd(,ll
Ames, Robert \Y. Tallman and George A. Malloch as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Responcl,:'nt and R~al Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, .J.-In these proeeedings Richfield Oil Corporation, an oil and gas producer, and Southern California Edison i
Company, a public utility electrical corporation, attack two
orders of the Public Utilities Commission determining that in
respect to its gas operations Richfield is a public utility gas
corporation subjed to the jurisdiction of the commission and
ordering it to cease and desist from delivering gas to Edison's
Ma1ldalay steam-electric generating plant.
This controversy arose out of Edison's wish to obtain and
Hiehfield's willingness to deliver a dependable supply of
natural gas to be used as boiler fuel for a new steam-electric
generating plant at Edison's Mandalay station in Ventura
County. That plant is loeated in the certificated service area
of Southern Connties Gas Company, a regulated public utility
gas corporation. Southern Counties objects to the invasion of
its service area by Ril!hfield. Edison contends, however, that
Southern Counties is unwilling or unahle to provide the gas
service Edison requires and that therefore it is compelled to
seek gas elsewhere. It points out that Southern Counties
offers it only an interruptible gas snpply subject to being shut
off when the gas is required fOl' Southern Counties' firm or
non interruptible customers and that Southern Counties will
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not commit itself to deliver a fixed volume of gas per year. It
asserts that use of fuel oil as an alternative fuel when gas is
unavailable is objectionable because of air pollution, and that
unless it can count on a given total supply of gas, whether
supplied with or without interruption, it cannot arrange for
an economical supply of fuel oil to complete its fuel requirements.
Richfield is willing to supply Edison with gas for its Mandalay plant pursuant to a contract it entered into with Edison,
but it is not willing to do so as a regulated public utility gas
corporation and has therefore refused to apply for a certificate
of public convenience and necessity to provide such service
and would not accept such a certificate if it were offered to it.
Southern Counties and the commission contend that Richfield's delivery of gas to Edison is subject to the commission's
jurisdiction and that since Richfield has refused to seek permission to perform that service pursuant to lawful regulation,
the cease and desist order was proper. They contend that to
permit a major producer of natural gas to commit a significant
fraction of the state's gas reserves to a major consumer without
regulation will defeat the public interest. They point out that
a public utility gas corporation must secure sufficient gas and
build adequate facilities to supply all of its firm customers,
predominantly householders, with all of the gas they need on
the coldest days. To operate economically such a system must
have interruptible customers, such as industrial plants and
power plants, that can use gas for fuel when it is not needed
by the firm customers, but who can switch to oil when it is.
If interruptible customers are permitted to secure firm supplies of gas through unregulated contracts made directly with
producers, the balance between firm and interruptible customers of regulated utilities may be destroyed. Moreover,
since there is not enough gas to supply all of the needs of all
of the consumers who wish to use it, it is contended that the
public interest requires that the commission determine how
the supply shall be allocated. .
There is no need to expand the persuasive arguments of
Southern Counties and the commission that the Legislature
could constitutionally provide for the regulation of Richfield's
service to Edison. It may be assumed that the public interest
in such an important natural .resource as natural gas would
justify under the United States Constitution comprehensive
legislation regulating all phases of its production and use.
The~e questions do not aril>e, however, unless the commission

)
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has been vested by the California COIl;;tit lit ion and lcgislation
pursuant thel'l'to with the jllrisdidioil OWl' Hiehfield that it
asserts,l
Richfield eOll t cllds tha t the COlllln issioll has no .i llrisdiction
to regulate it as a public utility gas corporation 011 the ground
that it has not deJieatl'd its property to a public use. It relil'"
upon an unbroken lint' of decisions from Thayer v. California
Del'clopmellt Co. (1912),164 Cal. 117 [128 P. 21], to Calitv/'m~a Water d'; Tel. Co. v. P/(blic Util. Com. (1959), 51 Ca1.2d
478 [334 P.2d 887], reCJ.uirillg' dedication as a prerequisite to
public utility regulation, and it contends that the requirement
of dedication is implicit in the constitutional and statutory
definitions of public utilit ies as utilities that render services
"to or for the public" (Cal. Const., art. XII, § 23) or "to the
public 01' an~' portion tl:ereof." (Pub. Ptii. Cod(', § 216, subd.
a; see also Associated etc. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 176 Cal.
518, 522-523 [162 P. 62. L.R.A. 1918C 849] ; Souza v. Public
Utilities Com., 37 Cal.2c1 539, 542-543 [233 P,2d 537].)
Southern Count ips contends that dedication of property to a
public use is different from service "to or for the public" or
"to the public or any portion thereof," and that the requirement of dedication was engrafted onto the statutory provisions
by the court to meet constitutional objections under the duE'
process clause of the United States Constitution. Since in its
view these constitutional objections did not survive the decision of the United States Supreme Court in N ebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 [54 S.Ot. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R.
1469] (see also Phillips PcirolCll1ll Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S.
672, 677 [74 S.Ct. 794, 98 L.Ed. 1035]; Federal Power
Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipcl!'ne Co., 315 U.S. 575, 582 [62
8.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037] ), it contends that the courts should
reinterpret the relevant statutes and give effect to the plain
meaning of their terms to the extent constitutionally permissible today. (Cr Carl F. W. BOl'gwarcl, G.lrf.B.H. v. Superior
Court, 51 Ca1.2d 72, 75 [330 P.2d 789] ; Henry R. Jahn &- Son
v. Superior Court, 49 Ca1.2d 855,858-859 [323 P.2d 437].)
Suhdivision (a) of section 216 2 of the Public Utilities Code
tIt is not contended that the commission's orders were or could have
been based on the commission's power to regulnte Edison. (See Pacifio
Tel. 4- Tel. Co. v. Public U tilitics Co-m., 3! Cal.2d 822, 828-830 [215 P.2d
441] .)
II I § 216.
(a) I Public utility' includes every common carrier, toll
bridge corporation, pipeline corporation, gas corporation, electric cor·
poration, telephone corporation. telegmph corporation. wntt'r corporation,
wharfinger, warehOll"'·lIliln, alll\ hl'at corl'ol':ltion, wht're tile service is

)

provilles: " 'Puhlie utility' indudes ever)" . . . gas corporalion . . . whcre the s('l"Yil'l' i" pcrforlllcd for or the coltllllodity
,1clivcrcu to the plt!>li',: Ot' allY portion t11('reof." Subdivision
(b) proyidcs: ,. \Yhcn('vcr any , , , gas corporation, , , performs a scn'icc or dl'livcl's a cOllllllodity to the public or any
portion thct'cof for whirh any compcnsation Ot' paYlllcnt whatsoe\'er is rce(:iyC'tl, SUt'll , , , gas corporation, . , is a public
utility subject to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of
the cOlllmission and the provisions of this part." Subdivision
(c) providcs: ",Vhen any perSOll or corporation performs any
s('rvicc or deliYl'l'S any COllllllOdity to any pcrson, private corporation, municipality or other political subdivision of the
State, which in tmn either directly or inllircctly, mediately or
immediately, performs such service or delivers such commodity
to or for the public or some portion thereof, such person or
eorporation is a public utility subjeet to the jurisdiction, coutrol, and regulation of the commission and the provisions of
this part." Section ~22 provides: " 'Gas <'ol'poration' includes
every corporation or person owning, controlling, operating, or
managing any gas plant for eompcnsation within this State,
except where gas is made or produced on and distributed by
the maker or producer through priYate property alone solely
for his own use or for the use of his tenants and not for sale to
others." Scction 221 proyides: " 'Gas plant' includes all real
estate, fixtures, and pcrsonal propert;\', owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of
gas, natural or manufactured, for light, heat, or power." Secperformed for or the commodity delivered to the puLlie or any portion
thereof,
"(b) Whenever any common ~arrjer, toll bridge corporation, pipeline
corporation, gns corporation, C'lectrical corporntion, tC'lephone corporation,
telegraph corporation, water corporation, wharfinger, warehouseman, or
heat corporntion performs n sen'ice or delivers a commodity to the
public or any portion thereof for which any compensation or payment
whatsoever is recei"ed, such common rarrier, toll Lridge corporation,
pipeline corporntion, gas corporntion, electrical corporation, telephone
corporation, telegrnph corporation, water corporation, wharfinger, warehouseman, or heat corporntion, is n public utility slIhject to the jurisdiction. control, and r('g1l1ation of the commission alld the provisions of
tllis part.
"(c) \Vhen any person or corporntion prl'forms ally sCf\'ice or delivers
any commorlity to :my pereon, prh'ntc co!'poration, mnnieipality or other
political suhdi,'ision of the State, which in turn either directly or
indirectly, m(',lintply or immerliately, performs sll~h ~crdrp. or nclivcl's
such commorlity to or for the ])nhlie or somc portion tllcreof, snch person
or corporation is a pnblic utility suhject to the jnristlietion, control, and
regulation of the commission and the pro\'isions of this part."

)
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tiOll 207 pl'ovi(i('s: " 'Public or any pori ion t}\('reo£' means the
public generally, or any limitE'd portion of the public, including a person, private corporation, munil"ipality, or other political subdivision of the State, for which thE' servi~e is perfonued
or to which the commodity is dcliyerell."
Scdions 207 and 216 or the Public Utilities Code were
enacted in 1913 in substantially their present form (Stat8.
1913, ch. 553, pp. 934, 938) as amendmcnts to section 2 of the
Public Utilities Act of 1911 (Stats. ex. sess. 1911, ch. 14, p. 18)
following the dec-ision in 1912 of Thavcr Y. Califol'1lia DeL'rloprnent Co., 164 Cal. 117 l]:28 P. 21]. In that case the comt held
that a melllber of the public could not demand service from a
distributor of water if the distributor had not dedicated its
water rights to public use, Although sed ion 1 of art ide XIV
of the COllst itution provide(l that" The use of all water JlOW
appropriateu, or that may herE'after be appropriated for sale,
rental or distribution, is hereby declared to be a public use,
and subject to the regulation and control of the state, in the
manner to be prescribed by law," the court rejected the contention that this provision "necessarily creates a public use
whenever any water is sold or distributed, regardless of the
number of persons to whom it is delivered, the manner or
character of the disposition made of it, or of the transfer of
the right thereto." (164 Cal. at p. 133.) It pointed out that
"In .Men'ill v. Southside Irr. Co., 112 Cal. 426 [44 P. 720], it
was held that the word' appropriation,' in section 1 aforesaid,
does not refer to the act by which the water is acquired, as the
taking from the stream, for example, but to the act or acts by
which it is designated, set apart, and devoted to the purposes
of sale, rental, or distribution. According to the theory of the
plaintiff in this case, whenever the owner of a water suppl.\·
determines to and does sell it for a price agreed on betweC'1l
himself and the purchasers, it immediately becomes subject to
public use, and any other pcrson to whom it can be conveniently distributed in the same manner would have the right to a
proportionate share of the water on the same terms as the purchaser, and, if the supply is limite<l, the first purchasers must
divide with all others who may come in and claim a share.
Under that theory, wl\{'?'e a person having a surplus of water
parts with a portion of it hy sales to otlle1's he thereby appropriates sneh portion to purposes of sale and dedicates it to
public 11se. This applic·ation of the sedion would destroy
private rights in water and com'crt every sale thereof into It
dedication to publie use. "Yc do not believe that the constitu-
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tion was intl.'JlIled to haw sneh cffcct, or that it should be so
construed. Articlc XIV taken as a wbole shows plainly that it
was intcnded to regulate the use of water appropriated and
dedicated generally for sale and distribution among an indefinite number of users. It could not have been intended to declare that a single sale of a part of bis water by one having
more than he needs would convert the use into a public use in
which others could share. If a single sale could not do this,
other sales of like character would not accomplish it. The section must be understood to apply to cases where one has appropriated water generally, for sale, rental, or distribution,
and not to cases where sales are made to particular persons at
a fixed price by ordinary contracts of purchase and sale."
(164 Cal. at pp. 134-135.)
If we were called upon to decide the question for the first
time in the light of modern principles of constitutional law,
we would have serious doubts that the broad language of the
amendments to section 2 of the Public Utilities Act should be
interpreted as including the limitation of dedication that the
court found in the constitutional provision it construed in the
Thayer case. [1] Although the requirement of service or
delivery of any commodity "to the public or any portion
thereof" suggests dedication, the definition of those words as
including" a person" or "private corporation" suggests the
contrary, and the language that is now codified in section 216,
subdivision (c) does not require that the initial performance
of service or delivery of a commodity be made "to the public
or any portion thereof." It is also significant that in several
early decisions the commission assumed jurisdiction over utilities that fell within the literal definitions of the Public Utilities
Act apparently without rcgard to whether or not they had
dedicated their property to public use. (Application of San
Fernando Mission Land Company (1914), 4 C.R.C. 384;
Application of Traders Oil Company (1916), 9 C.R.C. 463;
Application of Traders Oil Company (1917), 12 C.R.C. 647;
Application of Mary IL Wohlford (1917), 12 C.R.C. 505;
Calistoga Eleetric Company v. Napa Valley Electric Company
(1917), 13 C.R.C. 280.) Contemporaneously with these decisions, however, this court invoked the concept of dedication in
several cascs in holding that a public utility could not be compelled to deyotc its property to a use to which it had not bcen
dedicated. (Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman (1913),
166 Cal. 640,680 [137 P.1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822,50 L.R.A.
XS. 652] ; Palmer (Otay Water League) v. Railroad Com-
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mission (1914), 167 Cal. 16:3, 174-17;) 11:38 P. !>!J71; [hi
.1Iar lI"atO' etc. CO. Y. E,~hlcJ/lall (1914), 167 Cal. 666, GS3
[140 P. 591, 948]; Alch(son elc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com ..
(1916),173 Cal. 577, 585 [160 P. 828,2 A;L.H. 975] ; see also
Marin Wafer etc. Co. v. Tou;n of Sausalito (1914), 168 Cal.
587. 3!J;)-i)96 [143 P. 767] ; Palcrmo L. & W. Co. v. Railroad
COli/mission (1916), 173 Cal. 380, 383 [160 P. 228]; Camp
Rincon Resort Co. v. Esl!lclllall (1916), 172 Cal. 561, 564
[158 P. 186].)
.
In 1917 in Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railt'oad Commissioll,
176 Cal. 518 l169 P. 62, L.RA. 1918C 849], the court held that
the Legislature eouIIl not declare that pipeline corporations
were public utilities unless they hull dedicated their propcrty
to puhlic usc (see also Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad COUl.,
176 Cal. 499,304 [169 P. 59]), and since that decision it has
cOllsistClI tly interpreted the statutory definitions of public
utilities as applying only to utilities that have dedicated their
property to public use. ( ..1llen v. Railroad Commission, 179
Cal. 68, 89 [173 P. 466, 8 A.L.R 249] ; San Leandro v. Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 229, 232 [191 P. I} ; Story v. RicILardson, 186 Cal. 162, 167 [198 P. 1057, 18 A.L.R 750] ; Richar'dsoll \T. Railroad Commission, 191 Cal. 716, 720 {218 P. 418] ;
l([aft v. Rail7'oad Conw!'issioll, 192 Cal. 689, 702-703 [221 P.
926] ; SOl/tltem Cal. Edison Co. v. RailroatZ Com., 194 Cal.
757,763-764 [230 P. 661] ; Trask v. J1[oot'e, 24 Ca1.2d 365, 372373 [149 P.2d 834] ; Samllelson Y. Public Utilities Com., 36
Ca1.2d 722, 732-733 [227 P.2d 256] ; Souza v. PulJZic Utilities
Com., 37 Ca1.2d 539, 542-543 [233 P.2d 537] ; see also Commercial Communications v. Public Util. Com., 50 Ca1.2d 512,
523-524 [327 P.2d 513] ; Califonll~a Water «; Tel. Co. v. Pltblie FtiT. Com., 51 Ca1.2d 478, 494 [334 P.2d 887] ; Pajal'o Valley
Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utilities Oom., ante, pp. 256,261-263
[5 Cal.Rptr. 313, 352 P.2d 721].)
In 1919 the commission undertook an iuvestigation of the
services rendered by certain public utility gas corporations
and ordered that several oil companies who sold gas to the
utilities be made parties to determine whether the oil companies were also puhlie utilities. (Matter of Midway Gas Co.,
17 C.RC. 569, 571-572.) Thereafter, however, the oil companies were apparently dropped from the case and no express
decision as to their status appears. 111 its report to the Governor for the period from .July 1, 1926, to June 30, 1927, tlle
eommif;sion directed attention to the prohlem of the waste of
natul'U1 ~af; ill the oil aud gas pY'ot1ndion industry but pointed
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out that lleCl'ssary regulation was "outside of the jurisdiction
of the Hailroad Commission." (P. 92.) In 1929 it refused to
consider thc mcrits of a contrad fOI' tIle purchase of gas by a
public utility g-ns corporation from a California pl'oducCI'
(Matte?' of Southern Cali/orllia Gas Company, 33 C.R.C. 396,
398), and in 1951 it statcd, "At this point we desire to observe
that the price charged this utility by gas producers is 110t
fixed by this Commission or other state authority. Thus, the
utility buys ill an unregulatcd field and sells in a regulated
field. Unlike several other states, this state does not, by law,
fix the price of gas charged by producers. This is a matter
which might well have the consideration of the legislatUl·e."
(Pacific Gas &- Elccft'ic Co., 51 Cal. P.U.C. 130, 147.) III 1953
it terminated and dismissed an iuvestigation into gas availability and service ill California, and i.a its decision stated,
"The producers in California are not subject to rcgulation
by the Commission and the utilities must depend upon contracts or othcr arrangemcnts for obtaining the nccessary
local supply of gas." (Decision No. 49127,52 Cal. P.U.C. 766,
771.) It ordered its sccretary to mail copies of this decision to
the Governor and members of the Legislature. (52 Cal. P.U.C.
at p. 776.) (See also Gas Supply Company of Califonlia, 52
Cal. P.F.C. 324, 325, 326; Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
53 Cal. P.D.C. 133, 134.)
Since their enactment in substantially their present form
in 1913, the Legislature has repeatedly rl'enacted the provisions
of sections 207 and 216 ill amending, reenacting, and codifying
the Public Utilities Act. (Stats. 1915, ch. 91, pp. 118-119;
Stats.1917, ch. 77, pp. 1333-1334; Stats. 1919, ch. 304, p. 493;
Stats. 1927, ch. 130, pp. 248-249; Stats. 1933, eh. 784, pp.
2088-2089; Stats. 1937, eh. 896, p. 2478; Stats. 1951, eh. 764,
pp. 2027, 2029.)
[2] We may assume without deciding that initially dedication as a prerequisite to public utility regulation was imposed as a limitation on the broad language of the Publie
Utilities Act solely to meet constitutional objections that are
no longer valid. In view of the history of the act and the substantial reliance on its consistent intrrpretatiol1 and application by this court and tIle comulissioll for more than 40 years,
however, it must be l'oncluded that the Legislature by its repeated ret'nad1l1rnt oE tllc dt'finitiolls of puhlic utilities withent eliange has acct'ptrd and a,loptl'd dl'dication as an implirit
limitation 011 their terms.
[3] Therl' is 110 lIIerit in the eontelltioll that this cOllclu-
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sion render~ the broad lall~uage of section 207 and subdivision
(c) of seetiOll 216 sup<'rftuou~. Those provisions make clear
that a utilit~· that has ,ledicated its property to public use is
a public utility even though it may serve only one or a few
customers or a utility that ill turn serves the lJuulie. (See
Commercial Communications v. Pllblic Util. Gom., 50 Cal.2d
512, 523 [327 P.2d 513] ; Van Ilooscar v. Railroad Commi.ssion, 184 Cal. 633, 557 [194 P. 1003].) [4] Subdivision (c)
of section 216 also alla~·s any doubt that a public utility that
has been serving the public directly remains such even though
it turns its distributing system over to a publicly or privately
owned utility and thereafter limits its own business to supplying the utility that directly serves the public.
[ 5] We need not look beyond the oil and gas industry in
this state to see what an abandonment of the requirement of
dedication would entail. It would subject every oil and gas
producer that has sold or proposes to sell gas for light, heat,
or power or for resale to the public to the jurisdiction of the
commission. That jurisdiction is extensive, and the commission
is obligated to exercise it. (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 2101.) It includes jurisdiction oyer rates (Pub. Uti!. Code, § 728), services (Pub. rtil. Code, § 761), construction of plants and extensions thercof (Pub. Util. Code, § 1001), issuance of securities (Pub. Util. Code, § 816), and the disposing or encumbering of operativc property. (Pub. Util. Code, § 851.) The oil
and gas produccrs in this state ha\'e not bcen subject to such
jurisdiction when they have not dedicated their property to
public use. Although we may assume that the oil and gas
industry would have been successfully developed even if it
had been fully regulated by the commission, it would 11('cessarily be different in many respects from what it is. Such
broad regulation as that provided by the Public Utilities Act
could not help but have a substantial impact 011 the development of any industry subject to it. To impose such reg-ulation on the oil and gas industry as it exists today by a new
construction of the act would create manifold problems. Onl.'"
the L<'gislatnre can properly determine whrther or not such
regulation or some other form of regulation should now be
imposed to promote the public intercst.
Oil and l!as are onlinarily produced together ft'om the same
weils und fields, but the Public Utilities Act makes no provision for the regulation of oil corporations. [6] Althollgh
a corporation llIay operate part of its Imsill<'ss as a pnbl i(~
utility and part ill a pmrly pI'ivatc t'apaeity (Calif O1'n irr

Jlfl's. AsslI. V. /'1(1)111' Clifilie, CIIIII .• 4:2 Cal.:2,1 ;;;10, 5:)7 [:2(j,-;
1',2/1 1J ; Lamb v. Caii/orllia H"all rd.' 1'1 I. Co., :U Cal.2d 3:1,
40 [129 1'.2d 371J ; J/arill Iraler dc. Co. v. TOWI! of Sallsalito.
]G8 Cal. 587, 596 114:1 P. 7G7]). tIll' <ltlmillistrative diffkulti,'s
of effective regulation WllCll the byo parts an' so dos(']y intet'related as the pro<iuetioll 01' oil all,l gas are appar(,llt. 'Whereas a producer's ullequivo"al dl'lli('atioll of part of its propcrty
to a publie use affonls a hasis for :;egr('gating' its regulatell
from its unregulated adivity, if that settled stallilard were
now to be abandoned, some otht'r method would have to be
developed for segregating oil and gas operations for purposes
of regulation.
[7] Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
requirement of dedication has been of some value in obviating
regulation of lllany slllall producers whose activities fall within the literal definitions of the act but are too restricted to
merit publie conccrn. Although it Illay be true that this requirement has also permittell large producers to escape regulation that might ue wise, nevertheless, existing law provides no alternative to dedication for selecting those to be
regulated. Abolition of one standard to determine ,yho
should be regulated would compel choice of another.
It also bears emphasis that many of the major oil and gas
produeers in this state, including Richfield, are foreign corporations that cannot lawfully transact public utility business
in this state. (Pub. Util. Code, § 704.) [8] Of conrse, a
foreign corporation cannot escape public utility regulation
or evade public utility obligations on the ground that it'>
activities are illegal. (See Webster Mfg. Co. v. Byrnes, 207
Cal. 630, 640 [280 P. 101] ; Babcock v. Don Lugo Corp., 40
C.R.C. 699, 701.) 'Ve cannot reasonably assnme, however,
that in repeatedly reenacting the relevant definitions of pnbli,~
utilities the Legislature rejeeted the requirement of dedication
as an implicit limitation on those definitions, for had it donc
so, it would have rendrred unlawful by implication alone a
substantial part of the deYClopnH'llt of the oil and gas industry
in this state.
[9] Finally, cven if puhlie utility regulation were extended to all oil and gas prod1V~ers who fall within the literal
langnage of the aet, produ{'crs who used their gas tlwl11selv('s
or sold it to others to manufacture into ehrmital product,;
or to use for other purposcs not sprr·ified in tl1l' act wOII]ll
('sl·ape regulation. Regulationdepelll\('llt on how the prol]n"PI'
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disposl'll of his gas mi~ht stimulate h's~ ucsirable unregulateu
uses at the "Xlw11se of IlIOl'l' dcsimble regulated uses.
[10] The prodm'l'r's freeuom u'llder existing law to determine how his gas shall be disposed of so long as he does not
llc(li('ate his property to public usc has not resulted in sufficient misuse of gas or sufficicntly wasteful marketing praet ie('s to induce the L('gi~lature to dlange it, The Legislature
is uniquely able to amass ceonomic data and hold hearillg~
wl1('rc it ('an give heed to III all." representatives of the public
beside'S parties to a eontroYel';;Y, It can best determine whether
tlll'rc should be furth,'r rrg'ulation of the oil and gas industry,
and if so, the form it shouhl take.
Southern Counties contends, however, that even if Richfield is not subject to regulation as a public utility gas corporation, it was neverthelcss required to secure a certificate of
public eonYenienee and necessity to constru<'t a pipeline from
its Cuyama Valley and San Joaquin Valll'Y fidd;; to supply
gas to Edison. It rrlies on the provision of Public Utilities
Code, section 1001, that ":\0 railroad corporation whose railroad is operated primarily by electric energy, street railroad
corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telegraph
corporation, telephone corporation, or water corporation shall
begin the construction of a street railroad, or of a line, plant,
or system, or any extension thereof, without having first obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or
future public convenience and necessity require or will require
such construction." (Italies added.) It points out that this
requirement is 110t expressly limited to public utility gas
corporations, and since regulation of competition between
public and non public utilities is cognate and germane to the
regulation of public utilities, it contends that the Legislature
constitutionally vested the commission with certification jurisdiction over all gas corporations defined in sections 221 and
222. (Sce Morel v. Railroa.d Commission, 11 Ca1.2d 488, 496
[81 P.2d 144].)
[11] In the past, however, the commission has interpretru section 1001 as applicable only to public utilities, as is
illustratl'd by its failure to s\lbjed the oil and g-as industry to
certification jurisdidion. (S"<' also People v. Orange Coullty
Farmcrs & M. Assn .. 56 ('al.App, 205, 210 [204 P. 873J;
Baldwin Pal'k Domestic lFalrr Co. v. Union 'i'J'1I8t alld Savings
Ba.llk. I) C.Re. 685, 686.) '\~e a(!I'r(' with this interpretation,
for whcn the laJJg"uag(' of sedioll 1001 rPlied upon by Southerll
Count irs is l"ra(l in contrxt it is clear that the naming of

1;)4 C.2d

spe\;illc t~'prs o[ (,Ol'purat iOllS \\'1'18 illtrnded, not to extend the
certification requirement to other tltall Jlublie utilities, but to
specify the public utilitil'8 that mu~t s('cure certificates. Thus,
the second paragraph of section 1001 3 deals with disputes
between public utilitirs, section 1002" requires certification
of "a public utility of a dass specified in Section 1001" to
exerl'ise "any right or priyilrge untler allY franchise or pcrmit
hcreaft('r granted ... " and section 100(P providcs for enforcement of section 1001 by cease and tlesist order only against
"a public utility of the class specified in Section 1001." It is
also sigllifil'ant that when thc Legislature has undertaken to
give thc commission jurisdiction to regulate llonpublic utility
businesses whose regulation is cognate and germane to the
regulation of public utilities, it has ordinarily done so by
adopting specific legislation dealing with such nonpublic
utility businesses, such as the Highway Carriers' Act (Pub.
Util. Code, § 3;:501 et s('q.) now codified in division 2 of the
Public Utilities Code. (Hegulatioll of Related Businesses by
the Public Utilitirs Commission.)
[12] Had the Legislature wisheu. to r\'gulate competition

)

." This article shall not be construed to require any such corporation
to secure such certificate for nn extension ,~ithin any city or city and
county within which it has theretofore lawfully commenced operations,
or for an extension into territory either within or without a city or
city and county contiguous to its ~treet railroad. or Iinc. plant, or system,
Hnd not theretofore served Ly a puhlic utility of Iikt> character, or for an
extension within or to territory already servcd by it, nece"s:uy in t.he
ordinary course of its business. If any puhlic utility, in constructing or
extending its line, p;:mt. or system, interferes or is about to intcrfcr('
with the operation of the line, plant, or system of :lny other puhli,~
utility, already constructed, thc commission, on complaint of thc public
utility claiming to he illjnriously affected. !JISY, after hearing, makc such
order and prescribe such terms and conditions for the location of the
Jines, plants, or systems affected as to it may seem just and rcasonable.
"'No public utility of a class specified in Section 1001 shall hence·
forth exercise any right or privilege under any franchise' or permit here·
after grantcd, or under any franchise or permit heretofore granted hut
not herctofore actually cxerrised, or the exercise of which has been suspended for more than one year. without fil'gt hil\'ing obtained from the
commission a certificate that puhlic convenience and necessity require t.he
excrcise of such right or pri"ilq::e. This section shall not validate any
right or privilege now invalid or hereafter hecoming invalid under any
law of this State."
'''When a complnint has been filed ",ith the commission alleging that
a puhlic utility of the class specified in Section 1001 is engaged or is
about to engag(J in construction work without hrn-ing secured from the
commission a certificate of pulllic f'om'cnienee and nC'('cssity as requirl'd
by this article, the commission may, with or without notice. make its
order requiring t.he public utility coml'lained of to cease and ,lesist from
such eonstruct.ion until the commission makes and files its decision on the
(.'omplaint or until the further order of the COllllllission."
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between public utility and llonpublic utility gas eOl'porations
by re(juiring certificates of publie eOllvcnielll:C and necessity, it
is reasonable to assume that it would have (lone so by requiving
nonpuhlie utility gas cOl'porations to se(:ul'C eertificail's to provide srrviee, not merely to build plants or extensions thereof.
Regulation of plant eonstruction and extcnsion is a meaningful adjunct to overall public utility regulation, but as applicd
to otherwise unregulated non public utility gas eorporatiolls,
it would serve haphazardly at best to protect public utility
gas corporations from unde.3irablc competition. Thus, unle;;s
an oil and gas producer had dedicated its propcrty to a public
usc and was therefore subject to regulation as a public utility,
it would be free after its plant was construeted or extended,
to withdraw it from the use approved by the eonunissioll and
to use it to compete with regulated utilities. It could do the
same thing with a plant originally constructed to provide gas
for other than light, heat, or power, to which section 1001,
however interpreted, would 110t apply. On tll.., other hand, any
nonpublic utility oil and gas producer that was selling any
of its gas for light, heat, or power would be required, within
the limitations set forth in section 1001, to secure commission
approval to drill new wells or otherwise extend its facilitiei-l.
To reinterpret section 1001 to require such approval would
not only create many of the samc problems that would flow
from reinterpreting the definitions of public utilities, but
would do so without providing the overall public utility regulation necessary to make thc certification requirement of
section 1001 meaningful.
The question remains whethcr the commission's orders can
be sustained on the ground that Richfield is a public utility
that has dedicated its property to a public use. The commission found that Richfield" in rcspect to its gas operations,
is a public utility gas corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of this Commission (1) '"hich has dedicated gas reserves in
this State over and above the requirements of gas for its own
usc and gas facilities in this State to the public and (2) which
has performed and is performing' senice and has delivered
and is delivering gas to private corpOi'atiolls which in turn
either directly or indirectly, mpdiately or immediately, perform such service and deliver such gas to the public."
In considering the question of dcdication it is essential to
bear in mind that even under the commission's view, only
part of Richfield's property has been dcdil·ated to public use.
[13] Although RichfieJ(1 ('0111(1 llot wi1 htlraw property fro III
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Canal Co. v. Rajlrond CommissiuJI, 216 Cal. 639, 647 [15 P.2d
853] ; Van IIoosear V. Raill'oad Commission, 184 Cal. 553, 557
[194 P. 1003J), Hichfield remains free to use pl'operty it hit:;
not dedicated to public usc as it sees fit so long as it does 1Iot
dedicate such property or prejudice any public utility oblil!ations it may havc assumcd. (Lamb v. Oalifornia Water &; Tel.
00.,21 Ca1.2d 33, 40 [129 P.2d 371] ; Mound lV. 00. v. Southern Oalif. Edison 00., 184 Cal. 602, 610 [194 P. 1014] ; Marin
Water etc. 00. v. Town of Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 596 [143
P. 767].) Thus, eyen if the evidence would support a fil1dill~
that Richfield had dedicated some of its gas reserves anJ
facilities to public use, we must anuul the commission's orders
if they seek to regulate or prollibit Richfield's llonpublic utility
operations.
To support its finding that Richfield has dedicated its gas
reserves over and aiJove its OW11 requirements, the commission
relies on Richfield's disposition of its surplus gas and the
testimony of Travers, Richfield's vice president. Richfield
made two small sales of gas in the Sacramento Valley to the
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a public utility gas and
electrical cOl'poration, without restriction as to the use to be _
made thereof. It has agreed to sell to Edison 500 billion cubie
feet of gas at specified daily rates of delivery within the next I
25 years. In April, 1955, it entered into a five-year contraet
with Pacific Lighting Gas Supply Company for the exchange
of gas between its oil and gas fields and the sale of gas to
Pacific Lighting. Pacific Lighting is a public utility gas corporation that purchases gas from producers and resells it to its
affiliates, including Southern Counties, who sell gas to the
general public.
The Pacific Lighting contract defined certain of Richfield's
fields as basic gas fields and the gas therefrom as basic gas.
Richfield could add new fields to the basic gas fields or withdraw any basic gas field from the operation of the contract
if it connected such field with its own pipeline facilities. Certain other fields of Richfield were defined as emergency fields
and the gas therefrom as emergency gas. Richfield eould
deliver basic gas not needed for production or injection ill
the basic gas fields to Pacific Lighting, and Pacific Li~hting"
agreed to the extent of its ability to accept such gas not to
exeeed fivc billion euiJic feet pcr :rcar and deliyer an cql1h'alellt
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amount of gas to Richfield at other points in its pipeline
\System. Pacific Lighting could curtail the exchange of basic
gas in the winter and make up the deficiency before the following winter. Richfield agreed to pay specified fees for exchange
service. Pacific Lighting could elect to purchase elllergency
gas during the winter in amounts previously specified but not
to exceed the amounts it exchanged for Richfield the previous
year. Richfield could offer basic gas for sale instead of exchange, but it did 110t do so. It could also offer emergency gas
not requested by Pacific Lighting for sale or exchange in the
event of temporary plant shutdowns or other temporary
emergency conditions. Pacific Lighting exercised its option
to buy emergency gas during the winters of 1955-1956 and
1957-1958.
Travers testified that the first call on Richfield's gas was for
pressure maintenance in its oil fields, and that for many years
it had refrained from making any long-term contracts for the
sale of gas on a day-to-day basis. Richfield sells gas to the gas
utilities, however, to meet the peak needs of their firm customers and it "felt that the company should not and could
not refuse to make its facilities and its reserves available"
for that purpose. In the last year or two Richfield added substantially to its reserves and reached a point where it was
willing to sell a limited amount of gas on a day-to-day basis.
Edison offered a better price than either of the large gas
utilities, so Richfield accepted Edison's offer. Richfield has
refused to sell gas to industrial users, and it has no plans to
sell gas except to Edison and to the gas utilities for peaking
purposes. Before Richfield executed its present contract with
Edison, an attempt was made to settle its controversy with
Southern Counties over its proposed sale of gas to Edison by
negotiating a contract whereby Richficld would supply gas to
Edison through arrangements with Pacific Lighting and Southern Counties. The negotiations proved abortive. In discussing
them, Travers testified that he objected to a proposed clause
that would have permitted Pacific Lighting to purchase gas
from Richfield. "Now, I let that go in, into the final draft
but was advised by someone else the last day before we considered signing it that that might constitute a dedication of
our rcserves at that point to Pacific IJighting Corporation
which, as I stated earlier, we have lIcver done and do not
propose to do except for peaking purposes." Travers also
testified that Richfield wantcd to sell gas at a faster rate than
that provided in the Edison contract, and that "'Ve think
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that the second highest use for our gas in California is to
meet the peak requirements of the utility companies and we
are still in business, we are still prepared to render that sort
of service." He further stated, "Now, you realize that gas for
peaking purposes normally does not involve large volumes
but it does involve very high rates, so we feel that we can
maintain an exception of peaking gas from the general statement that we have solll all the gas to Edison Company that
we wish to sell at this moment."
Richfield contends that it has not dedicated its gas reserves
to public use by holding itself out as willing to sell gas to
the public or ally portion thereof; that it has only sold gas
to selected corporations pursuant to negotiated contracts. (See
California lV atcr &7 l'd. Co. v. Public Util. Com., 51 Ca1.2d
478,494 [334P.2d 887] ; CommLl'cial Communications v. Pu.blic Util. Com., ~o Cal.~d 512, 52:J [327 P.2d 513] ; Souza v.
Public Utilities Com., 37 Ca1.2d 539, 540, 542-543 [233 P.2d
537] ; Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com., 36 Ca1.2d 722, 732733 [227 P.2d 256J ; S. Edward.s Associ<rtcs v. Railroad Com.,
196 Cal. 62, 70 [235 P. 647}.) It asserts that Travers' reference to dedication of gas reserves for peaking purposes is
merely descriptive of its contract with Pacific Lighting, and
contends that the terms of that contract negative any inference of dedication. Thus it points out that Pacific Lighting
could purchase gas only in limited amounts, from a limited
area, for a limitell time, and upon limited terms, and that
Richfield reserved the right to withdraw any of its basic
fields from the operation of the contract and could defeat
Pacific Lighting's option to purchase gas by failing to tendcr
gas for exchange. Since llichfield, like the other oil and ga~
producers, can engage in the business of sclling gas without
dedicating its property to public usC', it contends that Travers'
testimony that "we arc still in businC'ss, we a're still prepared
to render" peaking service is consistent with its not having
dedicated its gas reserves. )IorcoYer, since Richfield is a
Delaware corporation that callnot lC'gally operate as a publie
utility in California, it contends that Travers' testimony that
Richfield felt that it "shoulll not and could not refuse to make
its facilities and its rcservl'S ayailable" for peaking purposes
should not be interpretcd as evidence of a willin~ness to enter
into an unlawful business, but only as evidence of a willingness
to fulfill emergency public needs by providing emergency
service on a sell'ctive basis. Finally, it contends that peaking
sCITice involves such uncertain qnantitiesof gas that its
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very natll\',' is ill\'oll,.,i"t('nt. "'illl an unequivocal and il'1'~vocable
dedication of P\'olH'l'ty to public u~e,
[14] Rl'solut ion of any ('onfiicting inferences that might
be drawn from Tmn'l's' testimony was for the commission,
however, and had it found that Richfield had dedicated its
. gas reserves for peaking pUl'poses to the extent it had supplied
such service ill the past, we are 110t prepared to say that its
finding would be Ullsupporteu. \Ve leave that question open,
for the ('ommission did not limit its assertion of jurisdiction
to Riehfield's peaking services. It asserted jurisdiction over
all of Hichfielcl's gas reserves and facilities not needed for
Richfield's own use. [15] Hichfield's service to Edison,
howevcr, is a new service supported by additional recentlyacquired reserves that Richfield has not dedicated to peaking
services, and it did not dcdic·ate such reserves by agreeing to
sell gas to Edison, for that salc was made to a selected customer and like service was denied to others.
Southern Counties and the commission contend, however,
that Richfield has dedicated the pipeline through which it
supplies Edison to public use and that therefore at least in
its use of that line it is a public utility gas corporation subject
to rt'gulation as such. They base this contention on the common-carrier condition in Richfield's permit to build part of its
pipeline across the Los Padres National Forest. Condition 18
of Richfield's permit provides that "The applicant agrees
to operate the pipeline during the period of this permit as a
common carrier to the extent required as to rights-of-way by
the provisions of tIle Mineral Leasing Act, and, within 30
days after request of the Secretary of the Interior, or his
delegate, as to rights-of-way, to file rate schedule and tariff
for thc transportation of oil or gas, as the case may be, as such
common carrier with any regulatory agency having jurisdiction over such transportation, as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe." The Mineral Leasing Act provides that
"nights-of-way through the public lands, including the forest
reservcs of the Unitcd Slates, may be granted by the Secretary
of the Intel'ior for piprline purposes for the transportation
of oil or natural gas ... under sUl'h rl'gulations and conditions
as to survey, IO('ation, appli('atioll, and use as may be prescribeu
by the Secretary of the Interior allli upon the express cOllditiOlI
that sHeh pipdincs shan be constmetcd, operated, and maintaiJ)cd as eOJnmon cal'l'if'l's ~1Il(1 shall accept, convey, transport,
or purchase without discrimination, oil or natural gas pro-
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,hll'C"il 1'1'0111 OOYI'I'lllllC"nt lanas in tlIP "i"illitr of the pipf'line
in f;lH'h pl'oport ionatc alllollllts as t hc SI'l'l'etal'Y or the I ntl'riOl'
may, at'tC"I' a fllJlIll'al'ill~ with dllC" notice thC"I'po[ to the intrrested parties and a prolwr findilll! of facts, detprmine to he
rcasonahle: j'l'vvidcd. That the ,'Ollllllon carrier provisions of
this section shall not appl~' to any natllral gas pipeline operated hy any person subjl'd to regulation unuer the Natural
Gas Aet or hy any public utility sUhject to lIoelll regulation] :
, , , Failure to comply with the provisions of this section 01'
the regulations and conditions prescrihed hy the Secretary or
the Interior shall be ground for forfeiture of the grant hy the
United States district court for the district in which the
property, or some part thereof, is located in an appropriate
proceeding," (30 U,S.C. § 185.)
Richfield contends that thc commoll-l'arrier condition imposes only the limited obligations of common-law common
carriage amI can be enfol'l'ed only by forfeiture and that therefore acceptance of a permit sllbjcct to that con(lition does 110t
constitutc dedication of a pipeline to public use within the
meaning of California law. In this respect it points out that
the terms of the federal act itself contemplate the granting
of rights-of-way to both public utility and nonpublic utility
applicants.
Richfield also eontends thnt. sinee common earriers of gas
were covered by the now-repealed provisions of the petrolellm
pipeline statutes of 1913 (Stats. 1913, ch. 286, p. 532; ch, 327,
p. 657), they were excluded by implieation from the definition
of gas corporations. (Pub. rtil. Code, §§ 221-222.) Moreover.
it asserts that the same implied exelusion would result if a
common carrier of gas is a pipelinp. corporation under existing
law as a common carrier of "crude oil or other fluid substancE's
except water through pipe lines." (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 227228.) It contends, therefore, that its acceptance of a permit
subject to the comInon-earriE'r condition would at most justif.\"
a finding that it is a pipeline corporation. Moreo"E'r. sincl'
pipeline corporations are IIOt subject to the certifil'ation provisions of sections 1001 and 1002, it coneludes that the commission's eease and df'sist order t'annot stand.
[16] We are not pel'suntlrd that a corporation that owlls
property for the "transmission ... of ~as" (Pub. lTtil. COllI:',
§ 221) as a eommon rarriE'r is not a gas corporation within
the meaning of sectiolls 221 and 222 because it was OIJ('e also
defined as a pipeline eOl'poration or is arguably so dcfil1l:'d
today on the theory that gas is a "fluid" snhstanee within tIll'
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meaning of section 227. Moreover, despite the differences betwccn the obligations imposed by the common-carrier conllition of the federal act and thosc imposed on public utilities
by the California act, we believe that the holding out to senc
the public implicit in common carriage is at least substantial
evident'c that would support a finding that a federal permittee
had dedicated its pipeline to public use for thc common carriage of gas.
Richfield, howcver, does not seek to use its pipeline for the
common carriage of gas and it may never be called upon to
do so. It wishes to use its pipeline solely to transport its own
gas in the course of its non public utility activities, and at
most it has evidenced a willingness to operate its pipeline as
a COIllmon carrier when and if it is called upon to do so.
[17] The Public l"tilitics Act is not concerned with Richfield's purely non public utility activities (see California Watcr
& Tcl. Co. v. Public Util. Com., 51 Ca1.2d 478, 488 [334 P.2tl
887], and dissenting opinion at p. 509; Commercial Cornrnwnications v. Public Util. Com., 50 Ca1.2cl 512, 518 [327 P.2d
513] ), and its certification provisions may not therefore be
invoked to prohibit the construction and use of facilities for
such nonpublic utility activities merely because Richfield may
in the indefinite future wish or be called upon to make such
facilities available for public use. When and if Richfield
wishes or is called upon to make its pipeline available for the
common carriage of gas, it may then be determined whether
its private use must be curtailed to avoid conflict with any
obligation to the public it assumed in accepting a federal
permit subject to the common-carrier condition. (Sce Commercial Communications v. Public Util. Com., 50 Ca1.2d 512,
518 [327 P.2d 513].)
The orders are annulled.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComh, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.
The petitions of Respondent and of the Real Party in Interest for a rehearing were denied July 27, 1960.

